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The  year  which  has  just closed  was  economically  and 
financially  a  time  of trial for  the  Community. 
The  ink  was  scarcely dry  on  the  Council's Resolution 
concerning  the  phae;ed  establishment of a  Community  economic  and 
monetary  union  when  the  exchange  relationships within  the  Community 
were  thrown  into disarray.  Some  funda~ental matters  having  been 
up  to  then left on  one  side  or  only  very sketchily tackled,  the 
Member  States  found  themeelves  unable  to  take  a  common  line against 
disrupting  factora  from  abroad.  The  common  Agricultural policy 
was  once  again  affected~  so  true it is that "the  ma6hinery  ciavisod 
for its operation presupposes  a  sufficient measure  of economic  and 
monetary  integration. 
When  the ·international crisis reached its peak  on  15  August, 
the  monetary  and  commercial  uncertainties it raised  added  to  the 
existing difficulties of the  Community.  They  acted  as  a  deterrent  to 
industry's plans  for  capital spending  just at a  time  when  the  Community 
was  in any  case  in  a  period  of slackening growth,  acaompanied  by 
continuing inflationary stre.sseo. 
The  Washington  Agreements  in mid-December  to  some  extent 
allayed disquiet.  The  introduction of  new  rates of  exchange  is 
calculated to reduce  monetary  insecurity,  and  the  dropping  of  the 
surcharge  and  the  discriminatory measures  the' United  States had  adopted 
or  was  planning  to adopt  serves  to lessen the  risk of  a  trade  war. 
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The  movement  of  the  international  economy  in  1972  will  be 
largely  governed  by  the  monetary  situation that develops  following 
the  Washington  Agreements~ 
Hailed initially with  such enthusiasm,  the  Washingt0n 
Agreements  are  now  being viewed  with  considerable  misgivingo  WP-
should  be  careful not  to  overstate  their implications either way. 
The  Ministers  of  the  Group  of Ten  were  out  to settle 
the  international monetary  crisis quickly,  because  a  quick  settlement 
was  in the  interests of all.  The  countries  which  had  floated  their 
currencies  were  in  a  more  and  more  difficult  economic  situation  ;  the 
countries  which  had  sought  to  protect their economies  by  controls  were 
compelled  by  force  of circumstances  to  make  those  controls 
more  and  more  stringent.  Exchange  distortions  were  becoming  ~larming 
the  risk of  trade  reprisal~ was  growing.  There  was  no  time  to  be 
lost in ending  the  chaos.  Such  was  the  main  reason  for  the  Agreements 
of  18  December. 
In  fairness,  they  have  their good  side.  They  do  away  with 
floating  exchange  rates  :  by  authorizing,  on  either side  of  the  new 
fixed  parities which  the  Central  Banks  are  henceforth  to  maintain, 
fluctuation margins  ~f 2,25  %,  they  introduce  a  measure  of flexibility 
that is reasonable  in  the  present  circumstnnces but  smaller  than 
that  which  was  previously advocated  in  some  quarters. 
0  ••  ;  ••• By  opening  ~:p  th~ way  to  commercial  negotiations,  after· 
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abolition of  the  surchr-;.rg6;  they  serve  to-dispel  t}1e  spectre·· 
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of unilateral protection measures. 
Over  and  above  this,  they  are  the  first evidence  of  int.:::r-
national  consu!tation on-decisions  which  admittedly  come  within 
the  exclusive  sovereignty of the  nation states but  have  to  take 
account of the  common  interest. 
However, 'it would  be  a  mistake  - and  a  dangerous  mistake 
tci  imagine  th&t  th~ Washington  Agreements  solve all  the  p~oblems 
raised  by  the  international monetary  crisis~ It is stifficient  to 
read  the  last  paragr~ph of  the  communique  published .after  the  Group 
of  Ten  meeting  to realize  precisely what  has still to  be  discussed 
a~d to  be  done.  A~att from  these  questions,  which relate  to  the 
"' 
reform  of  the  international monetary  system  and  which call for 
the  protracted discussions,  three  subjects are  of major  importance 
in the  short  term. 
The  first concerns  the return  to a  degree  of  dollar conver-
tibility. Everybody  knows  that in  this regard  the  United  States 
cannot  be  asked  to  undertake  commitments  which it w0uld  be  unable 
to  fulfil  ;  even  so,  meastires  should  be  taken  to  enable  the· Interna-
tional  Mohet~ry·Fund operations·to  be  carried out  smoothly  and  to 
ensure,  in spebific'caSes,  limited dollar convertibility. 
The  second  is  the  problem  of financing  the  deficit  on  the 
United States  balance~~ payments.  It~is difficult  to  believe  that 
the  re~lignment of exchange  rates  wil~ lead quickly.to  the  rcstor~­
tio.n  of. equilibrium  in  this ·par~ic~lar field,  al  th.o.ugh_ it  ~.s  true 
that a  reflux of capital  to  the ·United States ·in  the  coming  months  is 
expect~d _to  help. towards  reduci~g the  country'B  defioit~ But  nobody 
knows  how  marked  this reflux will  be.  It :is  therefore .not  unlikely 
that in  the  months  ahead  the  question of  financing  the  US  deficit 
will arise again.  How  is it to  be  resolved  ?  By  the  accumulation of 
further  dollar  balances  in  the  Central  Banks  or  by  the  usual methods 
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~mploye~~in ~htern~tionnl credit  ?  Tho  question is important  nnd 
:St11~l  an open  on<::. 
Thirdly,  nobody  disputes  the  fact  that  short-term  C'3.pital 
movernonts  have  over  the  past  few  years  had  a  disruptive  effect 
within the  internationAl  monetary  system,  either  when  they  have  been 
generated  by  differences  in interest rates  between  Eurcpe  and  the 
United  St~tes or  when  they have  been  motivated  by  expect~tions of 
.capital  ga1.ns  from  parity chanGss.  What  is urgently required is 
that  the  p~oblems inherent  in such movementsshould  form  the  subject 
of a  concerted  policy at international  level  ;  otherwise  the  m~inte­
nance  of stable  exchange-rate  rel'3.tionships  in  the  world  economy 
is liable  to  be  threatened  from  time  to  time,  since  the 
slightest tension or  the  slightest rumour  may  set up  speculative 
pressures  the  strength of  which  will  be  proportion~te to  the  extent 
of  the  migrant  c~pital. 
Quite  apart  from  these  specific  problems,  a  more  general, 
if not  more  fundamental,  observotion is called  for  :  the  realignment 
of  currencies  which  has  just been  carried out  will  not  in itself be 
sufficient  to  give  t~e intern3tional monetary  system  a  grei  3r 
degre~ of equilibrium.  The  efficacy of parity changes  dep~.Lds on 
the  stabiliz~tibn policies adopted  in  the  countries  concerned  an~, 
in  the  present  case,  on  that  followed  by  the  country  which  is 
suffering  from  a  fundamental  disequilibrium  in its  bal~nce of 
payments.  On  top  of this,  alterations of  ~xchange rates  have  only 
a  2.imi ted  influence  when  the  disequilibrium  in  the  balance  of 
payments  is bound  up  with  structurctl  factors  and  attributable in 
some  degree  to  exceptional,  extra-economic  factors.  It is for  this 
reason  that certain  difficulties will  doubtless  continue  to  be 
expArienced  in  intc~national monetary relations.  Thus  in  the  years 
ahead  management of the  internntional monetary  system  is likely  to 
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demand  unremitting attention and  close  coopero..tion  between national  .. 
. and  :inte.P_natione,l  monetax•y  autho:;oi ties. 
In  such  cooperation  the  present  Community,  and  in  the 
very  near  future  the  enlarged  Commqnity,  can  play  a  leading part. 
'  - .  ' 
Despite  the  internal difficulties which  it has  expo~ienced 
during  the  past  few  months  and  which  are  due  to  concrete  factors 
~ather than  to  a  lack of  the  will  to  ~ooperate within  the  Community, 
the Six have  maintained  throughout the recent international negotia-
tions  the  attitude  which  was  adopted  by  tha  Council  last September 
and  with  whicL  t~e United  KingdQm  has  constantly associated itself. 
The  Washington  Agreements  clearly represent  a  success  for 
this attitude,  since  the  currency realignment  embraces  the  dollar, 
as  desired  by  the  Community,  and  has  been  accompanied  by abolition 
of  the  surcharge. 
The  Community  has,  however 1  contributed  to  the  achisvement 
of  these  Agr~em~nts by  accepting sacrifices  which  cannot  be  under8sti-
mated~ The  extent  to  which  the  Six  have  agreed  to  revalue  their 
currencies against  the  dollar is considerable.  'l'hey  ha·.;~e  done  so 
in an  econo~ic situation which  cannot  be  said  to  be  propitious  to 
such parity changes.  They  have  thus  given United  St~tes exports 
an  advantage  which  is all  the  greater in  view  of  the  Community's 
substantial deficit on  trade  with  that country over  the  last  few 
years.  The  United States  trade  balance  will  be  further  strongthened 
' 
by  these  revalu~tio11s.  At  the  sa~e  time,  there is nothing  to  suggest 
'  that there  will be  any  le~sening of  the  iliarge-scale  outflows  of 
long-term  capital. which  f~r som;e.  ten years .now  have  been  a  major 
factor  in  the  externa~ disequilibrium of  the  United  Stntes, 
For all these  different  reasons,  the  Community  will  have 
to  make  sure  during  the  present  trade  negotiations  with  the  United 
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Sta.b:1s  that it safeguards its essential interests and  enters  into 
.~U:bseqtient iwgotintions  only  on  the  basis  of reciprocal  advA.i1tages 
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and  multilate~nl concessions-
It is in  the  context of the  situation arising out  of  the 
···  Washington  Agreements  that  the  proposals  just submitted  by  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  on  the  organization of monetary and 
financial  relations within  the  Community  must  be  viewed. 
These  proposals are  aimed 1  on  the  one  hand,  at  the  esta-
blishment  of the  Community's  own  exchange  system  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  at  the  setting--up of a  concerted  policy with  regard  to 
excessive  inflows  of capital. 
The  Commission's  first proposal  is  designed  to  eliminate 
the  drawbacks  to  the  functioning  and  development  of  the  Community 
which  would  result  from  fluctu~tion margina  as  wide  as  those 
henceforth authorized at  the  international level,  but also  to  put 
an  end  to  the  discrimination against  Community  currencies in  favour 
of  the  dollar,which  would  be  perpetuated by  the  adoption  of  such 
margins  within  the  Community.  The  Commission  hns  recommeuded  that 
the  maximum  margin  by  which  the  spot rates of any  two  Community 
cu~r0ncie3 may  differ should  be  fixed  temporarily at 2  %.  A certain 
flexibility - which is necessary Rfter  the radical  disturbances 
which  hnve  afflicted exchange  markets  in recent  months  - would  thus 
be  introduced  for  a  transitional period  in intra-Community monetary 
relRtions.  When  this period  expires,  the  maximum  spot differential 
between  two  Community  currencies  would  be  redllced  to  1 95  ~~. 
The  Commission is asking  the  Council  to  request  the 
Central  Banks  in  the  Community  to  intervene  on  the  exchange  market 
in Community  currencies  and  not  merely  in dollars.  It suggests 
that  they  sl1ould  be  allowed  to  hold  Community .currencies as  well  as 
the  various  reserve  asAets  in thejr reserves,  thus  opening  up  the - 7  - CAB/III/2/72<-E 
way  for  the  Community  countries  to  harmonize  their currency-reserve 
policies.  Finally~  with  the  aim-of ensuring implementation of these 
measures,  it recommends  the  use  of the  most  efficient technical 
methods  and  the  establishment  of a  European Monetary  Cooperation 
Fund,  whose  operations  would  be  expressed in a  European unit of 
account  determined  by  a  certain gold weight.  In  the  present cir-
cumstances  the  Fund  methoq  offers certain advantages  over  th€ 
other potential methods  of coordinating Central  Bank  interventions 
and  harmonizing  policies on reserves,  because  the  Fund  provides 
a  means  of establishing  gre~ter solidarity among  the  Community's 
Central  Banks  and  introducing better management  of  the  dollar reser-
ves  held  by  the  Community  countries. 
As  to  the  concerted policy regarding massive  inflows  of 
cnpital  from  abroad,  the  Commissionts  view  is  that,  with  the 
international  moneta~y situntion still rather unsteady,  it is 
impossible  t~ protect  exchange  ratQs inside  the  Community  and 
safeguard  a  Community  exchange  system  without  such  a  policy. 
In accordanoe  with  the  concept  which it has  always  upheld, 
that of keeping  progress  in  the  monetary  field  in step with  progress 
in the  aligning of economic  policies,  the  Commission  again $resses 
the  need  for  closer coordination of  the  Member  States'  economic 
and  monetary policies. 
There  is-nothing particularly new  in the  Commissi6n's 
proposals  :  since  February  1968,  w~en,  speaking  ou its behalf,  I 
first asked  the  Conference  of Ministers of Finance at their meeting 
in Rome  to  organize  the  Community  currencies  on  an  interdependent 
basis,  the  Commission  has  never  ceased  to  advocate  sud1measures  and 
to  work  for  their ach·ievement.  li'l'om  meeting  to  meeting,  from  ~()mmi  ttee 
to  committee,  either  these  proposals  were  considered  too  bold  ~nd 
were  set aside  for  a  later date,  or it was  said  that  they  were  too 
modest  and  must  go  very much  further.  But  the  fact  is  that  the  Commu-
nity has  gone  little further  except  in intention. 
I 
• • •I • • • Speech after solemn  speech has  been  mqde  in  the  lnst  few 
months  on  the  need  to  resume  progress  towards  an  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union  as  soon  as  the  international currency situqtion 
returns  to  normal.  In  an  international context  that gives  the 
Community  an  exceptional opportunity  to  orgnnizo  and  strengthen 
cooper~tion in  the  monetary  field among  1ts present and  future 
·members,  the  Commission sets be fore  the  Hember  Stutes  ~1.  proposCJ.l 
to  achieve  definite progress  that is economically  sensible, 
technicaily feasible  and  politically acceptable.  The  coming  months 
will  show  whether  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  programme  which 
the  Community  has  decided  to  carry out merits  a  different  f~te 
from  the  one  embodied  in  the  well-know quotation,  slightly amended 
... for  .  .the_J.)_urJ;l.QSG_:._~':r;Uk_9onstantly of it, but  never  think of it"  • 
.  _______ ._.L.2.h.oJJJ  .. d  __ }lOW  like  to  look at  the  present  economic  position 
-- ·--, -·-- --
of  the  Community  and  ou  tlinO-::Th-e-·nrre~nsts  we  ·can· rc·ason:tbly  mnke  now 
at  the  start of the  year.  Here  agnin,  whilst avoiding  over-optimism 
we  must  take  care  not  to  be  over-pessimistic. 
First let us  review  the  state of  the  Community  economy 
in  1971. 
Economic  expansion  slowed  dow~ in  the  Community  during  1971, 
from  spring onwards,  the  exceptionally mild  winter of  1970-71  having 
made  it possible  to  achieve  high  production levels at  the  beginning 
of  the  year.  For  the  Community  as  a  whole,  the  gross  internal  product 
increased in  volum"e  by .3,5 % in  1971,  as  n~ainst  ~,6 % the  year. 
before~ 
The  trend of economic  activity varied  somewhat  f~~rn  country 
to  country,  with  a  fairly rapid growth  rate  in Frnnce,  where  the 
gross national product  showed  a  rise  of some  5,5 % ;  a  revival  of 
economic  activity in Italy  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  during  which 
the  gross national  product  increased by  only.1% in  volume  ;  a 
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contimnus decl:in.e  of the  expansion  in Germany  and  the  Ba?~lux 
countries  from  the  second  quarter  onwards,  the  gross  national 
p~6duct increasing by  3  %  i~ volume in G~rmany, 4  % in  the 
Netherlands,  3,5 % in Belgium  ;  a  stand-still in Luxembourg,  where 
the  rat~~~ growth  wa.~  no  more_  than 0,5 % owing  to  the  drop  in 
demand  on  the  world steel market. 
Fewer  new  jobs,  more  unemployment,  and  fewer  unfilled 
jobs nre  features  common  to all  the  CoMmunity  countries.  Yet  we 
cannot assess  the  trend of the  situation without bearing in mind 
that all the  member  countries  have  hitherto been  experiencing 
overemployment  and  overheating  ;  in some of  them  the  structural 
problems  besetting the  labour market  h~ve been  obscured  by  this  fnct~ 
Prices and  costs  have  continued  to  shoot  up  everywhere. 
Germany  and  Italy alone  show  a  slight slowing-down  of  the  wage 
increase  during  the  second half of  1971. 
WCJ.ges  rose  by_an  annual rate of about  11% in France  and 
nearly  12  % in Belgium.  In  the  Netherlands  they  climbed  steeply 
again after the relative standstill in  t~e tirst half Qf  the  year. 
For  the  Community  ns  a  whole,  consumer'prices  increased by 
about  5% in 1971.  It is iriteresting in this connection  to recall 
that during  the  previous  slackening of  economic  activity in 1967, 
the  gross  Community  product  hod  increased by 3,2 %in volume,  whereas 
the  rise in consumer  prices  was  then  only 2,5  %o  In  West  Germany 1 
consumer  prices advanced  by  5,8 % between  December  1970  and  December 
1971.  In  l!,rnnce  the  price rise  wns  nearly 6  %,  in Italy 5 %,  in the 
Netherlqnds  8,5  %,  in  Belgium  more  than 5,5 %,  and  in Luxembourg  5  %. 
Turning  to  intra-Community  trade,  we  find  that  the  growth 
rate  weakened  perceptibly  (an  increase  of  12  to  13  %  by  value  in 
1971,  as  against  18%  the  year  before).  Exports  to  non-member 
countries  increased  by  only 3-4% volume,  while  imports  levelled off 
in  the  second half of  the  year  ;  the  s~rplus on  the  trade  bnlance  impro-
ved,  largely  through better  terms  of  trade.  .  ..  / ... - 10  ...  CAB/III/2/72,~g 
Lastly,  busii~sses show3d  less inclination  toward~ capital 
s~ending in nearly all the  Member  countries. 
Lo9king ahead  in 1972,  we  expect  to  see  a  faster  growth 
of the  gross  nRtional  product  in  the  United States  (5 to  6 % in real 
terms)  and  the  United  Kingdom  will achieve  more  rapid  growth 
r~te than  in previous  years  (3  to  3~5 %),  whereas  the  Community 
w~ll go  through  a  consolidating phase  ;  its gross  product  might 
increase  by  2,5  to  3  % in volume. 
In spite of  a  certain slowing-down  of  wage  and  production 
cost increases,  costs  and  prices will still show  a  high rate of 
increase. 
In  West  Germany,  the  prospects  for  the  months  immediately 
ahead  do  not hold  out  any  hope  of a  recovery  in  economic  ~ctivity. 
Admittedly  the  international structure of  trade  relations is more 
favourable  to  German  exports  today  than it was  during most  of  1971 
but  on  the  oth~r hnnd,  there  will  be  less capital  investment  by 
firms  and  consumer  expenditure  may  record  a  slower  pace  of expansion. 
All  in all,  the  growth  rdte  of  the  gross  n~tional product  should  be 
about  1,5% in real  terms,  even  assuming  that  the  Government  takes 
limited fiscal  or  budgetary steps  in the  first half of the  year  to 
start things  moving  againe  The  rn~in  problem  from  the  point of view 
of short-term  economic  policy is choosing  the  right  moment  and  the 
extent of  the  boost  to  be  given  to  economic  activity.  In  this 
connection  cnre  should  be  taken  to  ensure  th~t stimul2ting  the 
economy  does  not  trigger off further  wage  rises  Bnd  step up  the 
already soaring rate  of  consumer  price  incre~ses. 
In  Fr.r.tnce,  it appears  thnt  economic  nctivi-1:-y  may  be  able  to 
continue at  the  p~cc observed  jn recent  monthB.  It is true  that  the 
Washington  Agreements  hnve  pnrtly  wip~d out  the  exchange  advantage 
that French  &Xports  hnve  enjoyed  since  May  1971,  but  their  cxpan&ion 
does  not  seem  likely  t0  bo  too  seriously affected  by  this  ;  a  bigger 
;.., 
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impediment  might  well  be  the  low  growth rate of the  German  economy. 
Household  bonaumption  should still increase  fairly quickly.  The 
_capital  spending  and  a  possible  upward  revision of private enter-
prise investment projects,  particularly in respoLae  to  the  measures 
recently  taken  by  the  French Government,  should  contrihAte  to a 
s:~tisfactory growth rate.  It js not  too  much  to ·expect  the  gross  .. 
national  product  to  expnnd· by  4,5 % to  5  96  in real  terms.  -'fhe  first 
concern of  the  economic  policy,  however,  must  be  to  steady  the rise 
of costs  and  prices 1  especially since  a  certain slowing-down  can  be 
seen in  this  field  in Germany  and  Italy.  ~hus a  premature  or  ovor-
enthuGiastic  revival of  domestic  demand might  add  to  the  inflationary 
stresses  w~thout bringing any  basic  solution  to  the.unemployment 
prob;I.ems,  :which in France  appear  to  be  due  far  more  to  structures 
than  to  the,economic  short-term situation. 
The  likelihood is that in Italy the  recovery heralded at 
the  end  of  1971  will  proceed relatively satisfactorily.  The  halt in 
the  sagging  trend of investment,  the  building-up of stocks,  the 
strong upward  trend in public  expenditure  nnd  the  rise in wages 
and  salaries expected  to  occur in the  second half of  1972  will help 
to·make  the  GNP  growth  an  estimated 3  %a  The  rise in prices should, 
however,  be  more  rapid  than  in  1971,  mainly  because  of  the  intro-
duction of  fhe  tax  on  value  added  in mid-1972.  Nevertheless,  the 
reflation of the  economy  should  remain  the  priority econo,mic  policy 
objective  in  1972. 
Where  the  Netherlands is concerned,  the  forecasts  are 
less promising  ;  u  small  increase  in GNP,  of  the  order  of 2  % 
a  significant decrease  in  investment  in  volume  ;  a  marked  slowing-
down  of exports  ;  n  rise in unemployment  at a  relntively high level 
a  steep rise in prices,  estimated at  7  %,  as  a  result of a  continued 
upthrust  in  the  wage  bill.  The  trade  balnnce  will,  however,  tend  to 
improve  as  imports  reach  a  ceiling.  It remains  a  fund~mental necessity 
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undprices in the  Netherlands  to  become  more  stable, 
despite  tho  short-term  employment  trorid,  owing  to  the  dangor  to 
the country's longer-term  growth  which  a  deterio~ation in  ii~ compe-
titive position would  representa 
In Belgium 1  the.expansion will continue at a  slower rate 
(2,5-3 %)  ;  a  downturn  in  inve~tment by  firms  and  a  certain 
weakness-in  the  trend of  exports  can  be  predicted,  but  there  should 
be. ::..n  appreciable  increase  in public  investme!lt  and  a  further 
considerable.expansion in household  consumption.  The  outlook  for 
th~ trend in prices  and  wages  remain~ unsatisfactory.· The  refla-
tion~ry measures.already put  in hand by  the  Belgian authorities  to 
limit the  slowing-down  in expansion  and  its effects  on-employment 
will have  material repercussions  on  the  national  budget.  Besides, 
they will not  create  the  favourable  conditions  for  the  required 
moderation  in tha rise of costs and  prices. 
In Luxembourg,  the  better outlook  for  exports  to  non-member 
countries  points  towards  an  improved  growth rate,  while  the rise 
in consumer  prices  seems  to  be  d~clining. 
In  most  of  the  Community  countries,  therefore,  the  economic 
policy in  1972  will have  to  s~stain economic  activity and  protect 
the  level of employment  by  measures  selected and  applied  in such 
conditions  that  the  incipient recovery  of equilibrium in  terms  of 
value  is in no  way  jeopardized.  Stearing  a  middle  course  between  a 
satisfactory growth  rate  and  greater stability of  the  economy  promises 
to  be  a  difficult task everywhere. 
+ 
+  + 
\ 
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An6th~r difficuli year at  the  internationgl level,  and 
so:-:tewhat  dull at  the  domestic  leYel,  1972  will  be  espocialTy sign±-· 
ficnnt  for  the  Community  :  it will be  the  final  year  of  the  ~ommu­
uity of  the  Six.  On  1  Jo.nu.'J.ry  '1973,  the  enlargement  of  the  Community 
will  become  a  reality. 
Who  can  deny  that  things  will  no  longer  be  the  same  ?  Ch~nges 
are  inevitable.  In order  that the  new  members  can  be  absorbed  into 
the  enlarged Community  without serious difficulty and  that  the 
changes  to  come  do  not  too  radically affect  the  n~turc of  the 
Community,  the  structures of incorp0ration and  the  economic  and  finan-
cial bases  must  be  sound  and  the  machinery  of  the  Common  Market  must 
run  smoothly.  Thus  1972  should  not  be  a  year  of stagnation and 
marking  time,  but  a  year  of action and  progress.  Only  in this way 
can  be  maintained all that has  been  done  so  far  and  only in this 
way  will  those,whose  future  task will be  to direct  the  affairs of  the 
Community  within its renewed  Institutions,  be  able  to  continue  to 
strengthen it andthus  fulfil  the  hope  which  has  for  twenty years 
guided its founders  and  architectsA 
-:·~:-:-:-:-R  E  C  H  E  R  G  R  U  P  P  E 
IPPO  DEL  PORTAVOCE 
lUlU  VAN  DE  WOOROVOERDEH 
OKI':SMAN'!l  GHOUP 
INfORMATION  A  lA  PRfSSf • MITHilUNG  AN  01[  PRfSSf siNfOAMAZIONt 
AllA  STAMPA  •  MfDfDHING  AAN  Of  PfAS  •  PAtSS  RHfASf 
Brussels,  18  January 1972 
Sumnary  of  an  address  given  by  Mr  Raymond  Barre, 
Vice-President  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
to  the  European  Parliament  in  Luxembourg,  on  the  economic 
situation in  the  Community at  the  beginning  of  1972 
(Luxembourg,  18  January 1972) 
·-----------------------------------------------------------
In  a  report  on  the  economic  situation in  the  Community at  the 
close  of  1971,  Vice-President  Barre  this  morning  said  to  the  European 
Parliament,  "The  year  which  has  just closed  was  economically and 
financially  a  time  of  trial  for  the  Community.''  After  an analysis 
of  the  Washington  Agreements  of  mid-December,  Mr  Barre  considers  that 
they  are  virtually  the  first  sign of  an  international approach  to 
decisicns  which  are,  it is  true,  the  exclusive  preserve  of  sovereign 
nations,  but  which  must  reflect the  common  interest. 
He  went  on  to  say:  "However,  it would  be  a  mistake  - and  a 
dangerous  mistake  - to  imagine  that  the  Washington  Agreements  solve 
all  the  problems  raised  by  the  international monetary crisis.  It 
is sufficient  to  read  the last paragraph  of  the  communiqu~ published 
after  the  Group  of  Ten  meeting,to  realize  preciGely  what  has  still to 
be  discussed  and  to  be  done.  Apart  from  these  questions,  which 
relate  to  the  reform  of  the  international  monetary  system  and  which 
call  for  protracted  discussions,  three  subjects are  of  major  import-
ance  in  the  .short  term."  These  three  subjects are: 
(l)  The  return  to  a  certain  degree  of  dollar convertibility. 
(2)  The  problem  of  financing  the  deficit in  the  United  States 
balance  of  payments. 
(3)  Short-term capital  movements  which  in  the  past  few  years  have 
had  a  disruptive  effect  on  th~  international  monetary  system. 
Quite  apart  from  these  specific  problems,  a  more  general,  if not 
more  fundamental,  observation is called  for:  the  realignment  of 
currencies  which  has  just  beon  carried out  cannot  in  itself be 
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sufficient  to  improve  the  equilibrium of  the  int'ernational  monetary 
system.  The  efficacy of parity changes  depends  on  the  stabilization 
measures  adopted  in  the  countries  concerned,  and  in  the  present case, 
on  those  taken  in  the  country suffering  from  a  fundamental  disturb-
ance  in its balance  of payments.  In addition,  alterations  to 
exchange  rates  have  only  a  limited  influence  when  the  disturbance  in 
the  balance  of  payments  is linked  with  structural factors  and attri-
butable  in  some  dagrae  to' particular extra-economic  factors.  For 
this reason,  certain difficulties will  doubtless  continue  to  be 
experienced  in international  monet~ry relations.  Consequently, 
management  of  the  international  monetary  system  during  the  years 
ahead  can  be  expected  to  call for  unremitting attention and  close 
cooperation  between  national  and  international monetary  authorities~ 
Mr  Barre  then  drew  attention to  the  contrib:ttion  which  the 
~ommunity will  have  to  moke  to  this cooperation  between  national  and 
international monetary autho;ities.  He  remind~d his listeners of 
the  Community's  position in  the  matter,  a·  position  which it has 
maintained  throughout  the  recent international negotiations,  which 
was  confirmed last September  by  the  Council  and  which  Great Britain 
has all ~iong endorsed.  Mr  Barre  continued: 
"The ·washington  Agreem8nts  clearly represent  a  success  for 
this attitude,  since  the  currency realignment  embraces  the  dollar, 
as  desired  by  the  Community,  and  has  been  accompanied  by  abolition 
of  the  surcharge. 
"The 'community  has,  however.,  contribu'ted  to  the  achievement of 
these  Aireoments  by  accepting sacrifices  which  should  not  be  under-
estimated.  The  ext:::nt  to  which  the  Six  have  a::;reed  to  revalue 
their currenci0s against  the  dollar  is considerable.  They  have 
done  so  in  an  economic  situation which  cannot  be  said  to  be  propi-
tious  to  such parity  change~.  They  are  thus  giving United  States 
exports  an  advantage  which  is all  tho  more  remarkable  when  it is 
remembered  that  for  some  years past  the  Community  has  had  a  substan-
tial deficit  on  trade  with  that country.  The  United  Stutes  trade 
balance  will  be  further  strengthened  ~y  thes~ ~evalu~tions.  At 
the  same  time,  there  is nothing  to  suggest  that  there 0ill be  any 
lessening  cif  the  substantial  outflows of long-term capital  whi&h 
for  some  ten  years  now  have  been  a  major  factor  in  the  external 
disequilibrium of  the  United States. 
"For all these  different reasons,  the  Community  will  have  to 
make  sure  during  the  present  trade  negotiations  with  the  Unit~d 
'States  that it safeguards its essential interests and  enters into 
subsequent  negotiations  only  on  the  basia of  recipro~al advantages 
and  multilateral concessions. 11 
Mr  Barre  then  ~riticizod the  proposals  the  Commission  had  just 
put  to  the,Council  ~n'the ways  in  which'monetary  and  financial 
relations within  the  Community  should ·b·e  organized,  stating namely 
on  the  subject: , 
"There  is  no thing particularly 'new, u  he  sa:ld,  "in  these 
prqposals:  since February 1968'  Vlheri  on  the  Commission Is  behalf  I 
'· 
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first aBked  the  Conference  of Ministers  ~f Finance at  their meeting 
in Rome  to  organize  mutual  monetary  support  in  the  Commun::ioty,  the 
Commission  has  never  ceased  to  advocate  such  measures  and  to  work  for 
their adoption.  From  meeting·to  meeting,  in one  committee after 
another,  either  these  proposals  were  considered  too  bold  and  were  set 
aside  for  a  later date,  or it was  said  that  they  were  too  modest:.and 
must  go  vary  much  further.  But  the  fact is that the  Community  has 
gone  little further  except  in intention. 
11Speech after solemn  speeqh  has  been  made  in  the  last few  months 
on  the  need  to  resume  progress  towards  Economic  and  Monetary Union  as 
soon  us  the  international currency situation returns  to  normal.  In 
an  international context  which  offers  the  Community  an  exceptional 
opportunity  to  organize  and  strengthen  cooperation in  the  monetary 
field  among  its present  and  future  members,  the  Commission  is suggest-
ing  to  the  Member  States  that  they  take  positive steps  forward  where 
these  are  economically sensible,  technically feasible  and  politically 
acceptable,  The  coming  months  will  show  whether  the  progr~mme of 
economic  and  monetary  union  which  the  Community  has  decided  to  carry 
out merits  a  better fate  than  the  one  embodied  in  the  well-known 
principle:  •Talk  constantly of  action,  but  never  take it. 
111 
Having outlined  the  economic  developments  of  1971,  Mr  Barre 
concluded his  address  by  turning  to  the  outlook: 
"Looking  ahead  in 1972,  we  expect  to  sc:e  the 
product  growing  faster in  the  United  States  (5-6% 
doing  better  than recently in  the  United  Kingdom 
the  Community  will  be  consolidating its position. 
product  might  increase  by  2.5  to  3%  in volume. 
gross national 
in real  terms)  and 
(3-3.5)'6),  while 
Here,  our  gross 
In his  conclusion,  Vice-President  Barre  stated: 
"In  most  of the  Community  countries,  therefore,  economic  policy 
in 1972 will  have  to  sustain economic  activity and  protect the  level 
of  employment  by  measures  selected and  applied in  such  conditions 
that  the  incipient return  to  equilibrium in  terms  of  value  is  in no 
way  jeopardized.  Steering a  middle  course  between  a  satisfactory 
growth  rate  and  greater stability of  the  economy  promises  to  be  a 
difficult task  everywhere. 
"'l'he  year  1972,  a  year  in  which  our relations with  other coun-
tries will still be  delicate  and  the  internal  situ~tion rather with-
out lustre,  will  be  of particular significance  for  the  Community:  it 
will  be  the  last year  of  the  Community  of Six.  On  1  January 1973, 
the  enlargement  of  the  Community  will have  become  a  reality. 
"Who  can  deny  that  things will  no  longer  be  the  same?  Changes 
are  inevitable.  If  the  new  members  are  to  be  absorbed  into  the 
enlarged  Community  without  serious difficulty and  the  changes  to  come 
are  not  to  affec~ its nature  too  radically,  the  arrangements  for 
receiving  tho  newcomers  must  be  sound  and  the  mechanisms  of  the 
Common  Market  must  function  smoothly.  And  1972  must  not  be  a  year 
of stagnation and  marking  time,  but  a  year  of action and progress. 
Only  thus  can  we  assure  that  nothin~ done  so  far will  be  lost,  only 
thus  will  those  who  in its refurbished  institutions have  to  direct 
the affairs of  the  Community  be  able  to  strengthen it furth8r.and 
so  fu~f~l. t~e hope  which  in  the  last twenty  years  has  inspired  those 
who  founded  it and  those  who  are  fashioning it." 